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Abstract—Since the early 2000’s, the Internet Topology has
been frequently described and modeled from the perspective
of routers. To this end, alias resolution mechanisms have been
developed in order to aggregate all IP interfaces of a router,
collected with traceroute, into a single identifier. So far,
many active measurement techniques have been considered, often
taking advantage of specific features from network protocols.
However, a lot of these methods have seen their efficiency decrease
over time due to security reinforcements across the Internet.
In this paper, we introduce a generic methodology to conduct
efficient and scalable alias resolution. It combines the space
search reduction of TreeNET (a tool for efficiently discovering
subnets) with a fingerprinting process used to assess the feasibility
of several state-of-the-art alias resolution methods, using a small,
fixed amount of probes. We validate our method along MIDAR on
an academic groundtruth and demonstrate that our methodology
can achieve similar accuracy while using less probes and discov-
ering subnets in the process. We further evaluate our method
with measurements made on PlanetLab towards several distinct
ASes of varying sizes and roles in the Internet. The collected
data shows that some properties of our fingerprints correlate
with each other, hinting some observed profiles could be linked
with equipment vendors. Both TreeNET (which implements our
methodology) and our dataset are freely available.
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade now, the Internet topology discovery
has been an extensive research subject [1]. Historically, this
topology might be seen at three different levels: IP interfaces,
routers, and autonomous systems (ASes). In the IP interfaces
graph, nodes refer to interfaces collected by traceroute,
while links between nodes are links between IP interfaces. The
router graph can be obtained by grouping all interfaces of a
given router into a single identifier. This process is known
as alias resolution. Finally, the AS level is obtained when
one looks only at ASes and the links between them (in some
sense, one aggregates all routers belonging to a given AS
into a single identifier, the AS number). Recent developments
have suggested to improve this historical vision by adding the
Point-of-Presence (PoP) level (referring to routers grouped by
geolocation [2], [3]), or the subnetwork level (a set of devices
that are on the same connection medium and can communicate
directly with each other at the link layer [4], [5]).
Inferring the router level topology of IP networks is an
important concern in particular to study routing characteristics.
More specifically, inferring the design of an AS is crucial
for analyzing intra-domain routing protocol performance. Net-
work protocols designers could evaluate the performance of
their proposals on realistic topologies in order to highlight
their advantages and limitations. For example, performance of
fast-rerouting schemes or multipath transport protocols may
strongly depend on the underlying topology. Inferring the
architecture of an AS at the router level may help them to
develop efficient solutions able to perform well on various
topology designs and common patterns. The accuracy of alias
resolution is, thus, of the highest importance as also reported
by Gunes and Sarac [6].
In this paper, we introduce a general methodology to make
the best possible usage of state-of-the-art alias resolution
techniques. This generic approach, which does not depend
on a particular protocol or alias resolution method, combines
a space search reduction technique (i.e., chunking the alias
candidates set into smaller sets) induced by TreeNET [7] (a
subnet inference tool, currently only available for IPv4) and
a new fingerprinting process meant to study the behavior of
alias candidates and identify the most suitable alias resolution
technique. Fingerprinting, in this context, consists in deriving
a vector of values after collecting data on the alias candidates
via multiple probes.
We validate our approach by analyzing a groundtruth net-
work with TreeNET, that implements our methodology, and
the state-of-the-art tools MIDAR [8] and kapar [9]. Our val-
idation shows that the upgraded TreeNET is able to achieve
accuracy close to that of MIDAR while using less probes and
discovering subnets. We also evaluate our methodology further
by analyzing measurements we performed from the PlanetLab
testbed. Study of the fingerprints we obtained supports the
conclusion of an early study of fingerprinting that IP interfaces
showing a defined behavior can be linked with the hardware
brand to which they are assigned [10].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
provides the required background for this paper by reviewing
state-of-the-art alias resolution techniques; Sec. III presents
our alias resolution methodology; Sec. IV presents a validation
of our methodology along a comparison with state-of-the-art
tools on an academic groundtruth, Sec. V evaluates further-
more our method through measurements conducted from the
PlanetLab testbed; finally, Sec. VI concludes this paper by
summarizing its main achievements.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the common approaches for
resolving aliases. In particular, we focus on active techniques
(i.e., done at the same time as traceroute or shortly after,






One hop of distance 
(a) Conceptual view (b) 1st scenario: mesh of routers (c) 2nd scenario: single router
Fig. 1. The concept of neighborhood.
approaches range from analytical methods like in-depth anal-
ysis of traceroute records, as implemented in kapar [9],
to lightweight probing like IGMP probing [11]. The latter has
the advantage of silently collecting all multicast interfaces of
a router in a single probe. However, as filtering is now heavily
applied by ISPs, it is out-dated [12].
First, the DNS based method considers similarities in router
host names and works when an AS uses a systematic naming
scheme for assigning IP addresses to router interfaces. It has
the advantage of avoiding direct probing of each router inter-
face. Ally uses this technique against unresponsive routers with
the help of the Rocketfuel’s DNS decoder [13]. AROMA [14]
also combines this method and Ally’s technique. However, it
has been shown that DNS names can introduce errors due to
misnaming, leading so to poor alias resolution [15].
Second, the address based method is described in RFC
1122 [16]. The principle is simple: the source sends a UDP
probe with a high port number to the router interface x. If the
source address of the resulting ICMP Port-unreachable
is y, then x and y are aliases for the same router. The drawback
of this solution is that some routers do not generate ICMP
messages, making alias resolution impossible. This technique
has been implemented in many tools, such as iffinder [17] and
Mercator [18].
Third, the IP identifier based method relies on the IP
identifier field of an IPv4 header (or IP-ID), a 16-bit field
used to identify the fragments of one datagram from those of
another. This field is supposed to be unique for a given (source,
destination) pair and protocol. The counter used by a router to
choose a value for this field is often the same for all interfaces
and it is expected to be simply incremented at each received
packet. As a consequence, this field has been exploited for
alias resolution by tools like Ally [13], RadarGun [19], and
MIDAR [8]. In particular, RadarGun and MIDAR study the
speed at which the counter increments and alias IP addresses
when their respective velocity of incrementing their IP iden-
tifier is close (RadarGun) or show the same monotonicity
(MIDAR).
Finally, the IPv4 protocol offers several optional fields
which were considered for alias resolution, such as the record
route feature used by SideCar [20]. More recently, the times-
tamp option with prespecified IP addresses, i.e., prespecified
timestamp, proved to be useful for resolving aliases [21],
[22]. However, nowadays, the majority of deployed network
equipment block, for security reasons, all IPv4 packets using
options. Such a policy is notably recommended by the IETF
since February 2014 [23].
III. ALIAS RESOLUTION METHODOLOGY
We elaborate a general alias resolution methodology that
works in three consecutive steps. First, we use a space search
reduction technique to isolate the IP addresses that likely
belong to routers and split them in several groups (Sec. III-A).
Then, considering one group at a time, we fingerprint each
address from a same group (Sec. III-B) to assess the feasibility
of different state-of-the-art alias resolution techniques. Finally,
we sort the fingerprints and use them to pick the best possible
alias resolution method (Sec. III-C).
A. Space Search Reduction
First of all, one should attempt to alias interfaces together
only if their respective approximate location in the target
domain suggests they could belong to the same device. This
idea has already been put to practice by existing tools, such
as APAR (and its optimized implementation, kapar), which
considers aliasing interfaces only if their respective distance
(expressed as the number of router hops) differ no more than
one unit [24].
The first step of our method therefore consists in performing
a space search reduction (i.e., chunking the set of responsive
interfaces to speed-up alias resolution) with TreeNET [7].
TreeNET is a topology discovery tool that maps a target
domain by discovering its subnets and using this knowledge to
study the underlying topology. The subnet discovery combines
the algorithm of ExploreNET [25] with refinement methods
introduced by TreeNET to evaluate the credibility of subnets
and re-construct large subnets which were initially discovered
in several chunks. Then, it builds a tree-like structure we called
network tree to discover neighborhoods. A neighborhood is a
location inside a network bordered by a set of subnets that can
all reach each other with at most one router hop. In practice, a
neighborhood is either a single router, either a mesh of several
routers, possibly connected together with Layer-2 equipment
(such as Ethernet switches). Fig. 1 shows an example of a
neighborhood, both conceptually and practically, with the two
possible scenarios for the real topology.
To discover the neighborhoods of a target domain,
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Fig. 2. Example of a network tree and a topology it can model.
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Fig. 3. The alias candidates found around a
neighborhood.
towards each subnet (i.e., to one responsive IP address of
that subnet). Indeed, when two subnets have a route of the
same length that ends with the same last hop, they are most
likely accessed through the same ingress router or the same
mesh of routers (with or without Layer-2 equipment), and
therefore belong to the same neighborhood. Our network
tree is essentially an algorithmic approach to gather together
subnets for which the route is very similar. The main idea is
to view subnets as the tree leaves, while the internal nodes
will model neighborhoods. Each internal node bears a label,
i.e., an IP address found in a traceroute record at the
position matching the depth at which the node is located.
As a set of traceroute records consists most of the time
of a directed acyclic graph rather than a tree, the structure
was adapted to allow internal nodes to bear several labels.
These nodes model the fact that, at a given hop count in
similar traceroute records (i.e., their final hops are almost
identical), the observed interface varies from one record to
another due to traffic engineering (e.g., load balancing) and can
be seen as a superposition of neighborhoods. This modification
allows deeper internal nodes to gather all subnets which
the route ends with the same last hop, as building a tree
without it would result in neighborhoods being split across
several branches1. Later, we group together child subnets of an
internal node with multiples labels when they share the same
last hop in their respective route. This simple grouping by last
hop allows us to disambiguate an internal node with multiple
labels and get back to individual and sounder neighborhoods,
rather than a superposition.
Fig. 2(a) shows a toy example of a network tree. Grey clouds
model the leaves of the tree, the subnets, while black circles
represent internal nodes, therefore neighborhoods. Each subnet
is annotated with a possible route to it, while each internal
node is labelled with the route hop(s) crossed to reach its
children. Notice the black arrows: they show the fact that a
subnet can encompass labels of close internal nodes, meaning
that the subnet acts as a link between its parent node and the
children internal nodes of the same parent node in the actual
1Interested readers might refer to Grailet et al. [7] for more details.
topology. These arrows are therefore not part of the structure,
but rather an observation made after building the tree. For the
sake of clarity, we also provide Fig. 2(b) to show a possible
actual topology matching our toy example.
What makes the discovery of neighborhoods especially
useful in the context of alias resolution is the fact that one can
identify, within a subnet, the interface located on its ingress
router. Indeed, while most observed interfaces of a subnet are
located at the same distance, at least one should be located
one hop sooner: the interface located on the ingress router.
In certain situations, there might even be several interfaces
of that kind, such as back-up interfaces for critical subnets2.
Discovering neighborhoods therefore amounts to discovering
groups of interfaces that necessarily belong to routers and
located in a same area, because found either at the last hop
in the traceroute records of the local subnets, either at a
specific amount of hops in the same subnets.
Therefore, during alias resolution, we will only consider for
aliasing IP addresses from a same group rather than the whole
addresses set which are likely to be router interfaces. Doing
so, we expect to spare a lot of effort in the alias resolution
process, especially in terms of probing. We will refer to IP
interfaces likely to belong to routers as alias candidates in
subsequent sections. Fig. 3 shows a neighborhood as seen in
a network tree and the alias candidates surrounding it.
Starting alias resolution from the observation of a network
tree is especially interesting for TreeNET, as it allows the tool
to naturally extend into a router – subnet topology discovery
tool, instead of focusing on only subnets or routers.
B. Fingerprinting
The second step of our methodology consists in collecting
data from each alias candidate of a same neighborhood and
fingerprint them, using multiple probing methods. Each inter-
face is probed as follows: (i) several ICMP probes, within a
short timeframe, (ii) a single UDP packet to a very high port
number, and, (iii), a single ICMP timestamp-request.
2Again, we cover this topic with more details in [7].
Additionally, the DNS name of each interface is retrieved when
possible.
The ICMP probes, simply consisting in echo-request,
have multiple purposes. Their primary task is to collect a
sequence of IP-IDs via the encapsulating IPv4 headers. The
delays (wall clock time, in milliseconds) between consecutive
observed IP-IDs are also recorded, and an integer token
(unique among all probes) is assigned to each IP-ID to keep
track of the order in which probes were sent. Indeed, ICMP
probes sent to multiple alias candidates are scheduled to ensure
interleaving between tokens. The tokens along the IP-IDs
allow us to later use the method applied by Ally (i.e., for two
interfaces, it requires four IP-IDs with interleaving tokens),
while the delays are useful to estimate the speed at which
the IP-IDs of a given IP address increments, in order to alias
interfaces with similar speeds when Ally cannot be used.3 The
secondary task of the ICMP probes is to detect when an inter-
face simply echoes the IP-ID in the ICMP echo-request
packet. Finally, the TTLs found in the replies are also checked
to infer what was the initial TTL of the echo-reply packet,
as it has been previously demonstrated that the initial TTL
value is related to a router brand [10]. It simply consists in
picking the typical initial value (32, 64, 128, or 255) that is
just above the remaining TTL in an echo-reply packet.
Two alias candidates that do not have the same initial TTL
should never be aliased.
The amount of ICMP probes can be configured in
TreeNET, but by default, we set it to four probes per IP
address, for a total of six probes for the whole fingerprinting
of a single IP address. This choice is a compromise between
being able to evaluate the speed at which IP-IDs increment
(with at least three time periods) and using a small amount of
probes, to avoid the target domain identifying the probes as
an attack.
The collected IP-IDs are also used to derive an IP-ID
counter class. It is a class derived from the sequence of IP-
IDs collected for a given IP address. We consider three classes:
echo, healthy, and random. An IP interface will have the echo
class if it always replies with the same IP-IDs as those sent
along the probe packets, i.e., it echoes the IP-IDs. On the
other hand, the healthy class label denotes an IP address which
does not echo IP-IDs and for which the IP-IDs form a sound
increasing sequence. Finally, an IP address with the random
class does not echo IP-IDs, but the collected IP-IDs do not
form a sound increasing sequence and seem to be drawn at
random. This simple classification allows us, later, to quickly
check whether IP-ID-based methods are viable or not.
The single UDP probe is sent to obtain an ICMP
Port-unreachable required for the address-based alias
resolution method. Finally, the ICMP timestamp-re-
quest provides an additional piece of information, i.e.,
whether this interface replies to such a request or not. Indeed,
implementing the ICMP timestamp-reply is optional for
routers, and the fact that two alias candidates reply to ICMP
3This method, inspired by RadarGun and MIDAR, is also detailed in [7].
Fig. 4. Examples of fingerprints. The five values of a fingerprint vector
are: inferred initial TTL (1), source address of ICMP Port-unreachable
(2), IP-ID counter class (3), existence of DNS (4), and compliance to ICMP
timestamp-request (5).
timestamp-request might be an additional hint that they
belong, to the least, to a similar device.
The fingerprint we derive from the data collected for each
interface therefore consists of a vector of five values:
1) the inferred initial TTL of the echo-reply,
2) the source address of the ICMP Port-unreachable,
if the interface was responsive to UDP,
3) the IP-ID counter class,
4) the existence of a DNS (Yes or No),
5) the implementation of the reply to ICMP time-
stamp-request (Yes or No).
Fig. 4 shows examples of fingerprints. Whenever part of the
data is unavailable, the corresponding part in the fingerprint is
set to *.
C. Selecting an Alias Resolution Method
The final step of our approach is the actual alias resolution.
Just like during the fingerprinting process, we start with the
neighborhoods that were previously inferred by TreeNET,
one neighborhood at a time. The fingerprints computed for
a given neighborhood are sorted such that similar fingerprints
appear consecutively in the list. We consider two fingerprints
as similar if each value of the vectors is identical, except for
the DNS part, because we observed more than once routers
where only specific interfaces had a host name.
Then, we consider groups of similar fingerprints, one at a
time, and pick an alias resolution method depending on the
available data. If all corresponding IP addresses replied to
the UDP probes, we try the address-based approach, which
is likely to be the most accurate since another interface is
explicitly mentioned in the fingerprint. It should be noted that,
if the IP interface that replied to the UDP probe appears in
the full list of fingerprints, both addresses will be aliased no
matter what the fingerprint of the second IP address looks
like. If the address-based approach cannot be used and if
fingerprints have the healthy IP-ID counter class, we will
rather use the IP-ID-based methods, i.e., the same technique
as Ally and a velocity-based method if Ally cannot be used
(as explained in Sec. III-B). These methods are also used to
merge a newly obtained alias with one previously obtained
through the address-based approach, if the related fingerprints
also had the healthy IP-ID counter class.
The last groups of similar fingerprints should be those
for which neither the address-based, neither the IP-ID-based
approaches can be used. In such a case, we rely on the
fact that we drastically reduced the problem to a small set
of alias candidates (through neighborhood inference and the
grouping of similar fingerprints) and group the corresponding
IP addresses into an alias. There is however an exception:
if the host names of two alias candidates are too different
(i.e., there are differences beyond the first dot), we do not
alias them. In other words, we use reverse DNS not to
build aliases but to reject potential aliases. Indeed, building
aliases through reverse DNS would require additional inputs to
comply with the different naming conventions observed in the
target domains and maximize accuracy. We also use this policy
for IP interfaces for which the fingerprint is nearly empty (i.e.,
only the DNS is known). Our approach is implemented in
TreeNET.
IV. VALIDATION
Before deploying in the wild our alias resolution method-
ology, we first validate its implementation in TreeNET and
compare it with other state-of-the-art tools on a groundtruth
network. In Sec. IV-A, we briefly describe our groundtruth net-
work and the methodology we followed. Then, in Sec. IV-B,
we present and discuss our results.
A. Groundtruth and Methodology
We ran TreeNET on an academic network for which we
know the actual routers and their respective interfaces.4 It is
important to note that we used a (single) internal vantage point,
as a firewall drastically reduces the amount of responsive IP
addresses if we probe the same network from an external
vantage point.
The groundtruth network is made of one /16 IPv4 block
completed with two additional /24 blocks used for the back-
bone. It is worth noticing that the known topology is essen-
tially in the /16 block and that only a portion of the routers
from the backbone is known. Moreover, it should also be noted
that most if not all interfaces within the /16 are fit for IP-ID-
based alias resolution.
We also ran MIDAR on the same network for the sake of
comparison. However, while TreeNET could be used “as is”
to probe the network and discover both subnets and aliases,
MIDAR required some preparation. Indeed, probing all IP
interfaces within the target blocks to list potential addresses
that should be considered for alias resolution would have made
the first step of MIDAR needlessly long. We therefore used one
of the first steps of TreeNET, known as pre-scanning, to list
all responsive interfaces within the target network and avoid
all unresponsive ones. This speeds up TreeNET as well as
the first step of MIDAR.
In addition, we also collected traces with Paris
traceroute to all responsive IP addresses in order
to be able to use kapar. Our motivation for using this tool
is that it also performs a kind of space search reduction to
isolate IP addresses that are likely to be on the same device,
as we mentioned in Sec. III-A.
TreeNET MIDAR kapar
True positive rate 81.78% 98.14% 0.19%
False positive rate 0.22% 0.29% 0.12%
False discovery rate 3.6% 3.65% 91.67%
Precision 96.39% 96.35% 8.33%
Accuracy 98.6% 99.6% 94.47%
Duration (alias reso.) 3’45" 1h47 A few sec.
Duration (total) 1h56 2h28 2h12
# probes (alias reso.) 1948 ∼ 6.6 × 105 0
TABLE I
VALIDATION RESULTS
B. Results and Discussion
Table I shows the main results of our validation, based on
the alias pairs obtained by each method. The total duration at
the bottom of the table includes all steps mentioned earlier;
for instance, the 2h12 total duration of kapar is due to the
elimination of unresponsive addresses and traceroute to
responsive ones. Overall, our alias resolution methodology
implemented in TreeNET shows very good accuracy along
with a low false positive rate, though it falls short behind
MIDAR in terms of overall accuracy. However, looking at the
second part of the table shows that TreeNET is considerably
more economic when it comes to probing. Indeed, during our
tests, MIDAR sent more than half a million of probes, with an
average of 37 probes sent per target interface during its second
stage where it estimates the speed of the IP-ID counters of
each IP address. TreeNET, on the other hand, sends only
an average of 6 probes to each address considered for alias
resolution and completes the collection of alias resolution
hints (see Sec. III-B) in minutes (space search reduction along
subnet inference are however included in the total duration).
While TreeNET achieves accurate alias resolution much
faster, it also comes with a lower true positive rate than
MIDAR. This true positive rate is a consequence of a higher
rate of false negatives rather than inaccuracy of our aliasing
methods, and we explain this higher rate of false negatives by
the existence of incomplete neighborhoods in the network tree
built by TreeNET. A neighborhood is said to be incomplete
when the subnets appearing around it in the data do not include
all observable subnets appearing around the same neighbor-
hood in the real network. The main cause of this phenomenon
is traffic engineering (e.g., load balancing). Indeed, traffic
engineering can cause slight variations in routing: for two
subnets which can reach each other with at most one hop
in the network, it is indeed possible that one will be reached
through a different route than its neighbor, or a slightly longer
route (this phenomenon is also known as route stretching).
Therefore, they will appear in different places during space
search reduction, which will prevent the alias resolution from
correctly aliasing the interfaces on their common ingress
router.
We observed a practical case of this issue on our
groundtruth: one subnet featured a unique route when com-
pared to what should be its neighbors in the real network,
and produced a separate neighborhood with two alias can-
didates. Because the real neighborhood was quite large and
4For security reasons, we do not provide this groundtruth in our repository.
implemented by a single router, the rate of false negatives
among alias pairs was noticeably increased. This observation
is confirmed by the fact that, if we manually fix the large alias
to add the two missing interfaces and re-run our validation, the
true positive rate rises to 85.07% for TreeNET.
We intend to mitigate this issue in the future by adding post-
processing steps (with or without additional probing) to both
the measurements and the construction of the network tree.
In particular, we believe improving our (Paris) traceroute
step and post-processing its records could prove useful.
Last but not least, while the space search reduction itself
takes time (total execution of TreeNET is around one hour
and 56 minutes), it is important to keep in mind that it comes
with very useful data that other tools do not provide: subnets.
On our groundtruth, TreeNET manages to have more than
90% of its inferred subnets to be faithful to the topology,
leading, along with our aliases, to a rather complete map of
our groundtruth. Collecting both subnets and aliases at once
is very promising for modeling, and future tools could also
embed alias resolution in a similar fashion to TreeNET to
both collect aliases more easily and obtain a more complete
mapping of a network.
Finally, it goes without saying that kapar is not well suited
in this situation. Indeed, most if not all its correct aliases were
found in the backbone, and moreover, our groundtruth only
contains a part of it. This is why the true positive rate is so
low. kapar is therefore not suited for studying and modeling
the topology of an “end” network such as our groundtruth,
unlike TreeNET and MIDAR.
V. DEPLOYMENT
In this section, we evaluate furthermore our alias resolution
methodology from several perspectives. First, we describe how
we deployed TreeNET to measure different ASes (Sec. V-A).
Then, we analyze the collected data to quantify space search
reduction (Sec. V-B) and to discuss the relevancy of finger-
printing for alias resolution (Sec. V-C). Finally, we discuss
the overall merit of our methodology with respect to alias
resolution (Sec. V-D).
A. Measurement Methodology
We used the BGP Toolkit of Hurricane Electric5 to select
ASes of varying sizes and roles in the Internet topology. We
listed 20 different ASes and their respective IPv4 prefixes with
an amount of potential addresses ranging from a bit more
than 30,000 to a little bit less than 2 millions. To ensure we
had different profiles in our list, we used the AS relationships
provided by CAIDA [27]. Table II lists all the ASes we probed,
along with their respective name, type (i.e., level in the AS
hierarchy graph), and amount of potential addresses. For the
sake of clarity, we also assign a number to each AS to denote
them in our subsequent plots. The list is also split in two, with
the first part listing ASes owning large amount of addresses
(i.e., more than 500,000).
5See http://bgp.he.net
N. ASN Name Type #IPs
1 109 Cisco Systems Stub 1,600,512
2 10010 TOKAI Com. Transit 1,860,096
3 224 UNINETT Stub 1,115,392
4 2764 AAPT Limited Transit 1,074,688
5 5400 British Telecom Transit 1,385,472
6 5511 Orange S.A. Transit 922,880
7 6453 TATA Com. Tier-1 966,144
8 703 Verizon Business Transit 873,728
9 8220 COLT Tech. Transit 1,372,160
10 8928 Interoute Com. Transit 841,728
11 12956 Telefonica Int. Tier-1 215,040
12 13789 Internap Net. Transit 106,240
13 14 U. Columbia Stub 339,968
14 22652 Fibrenoire, Inc. Transit 76,544
15 30781 Jaguar Network Transit 45,824
16 37 U. Maryland Stub 140,544
17 4711 INET Inc. Stub 34,816
18 50673 Serverius Hold. Transit 65,280
19 52 U. California Stub 328,960
20 802 U. York Stub 75,264
TABLE II
TARGET ASES OF OUR CAMPAIGN
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Fig. 5. Benefits of space search reduction (April 14th, 2017).
For each target AS, we ran TreeNET, implementing our
alias resolution methodology, on a distinct PlanetLab node
(i.e., we used a total of 20 PlanetLab nodes). We renewed
our measurements by running periodic campaigns (e.g., we
conducted one in January 2017, another started in April of
the same year, etc.) during which we probed each AS several
times, letting a delay of approximately one day between
each consecutive measurement. We chose this delay to avoid
imposing a heavy load on the targeted ASes, therefore avoiding
any form of blacklisting. The data collected include subnets
inferred by TreeNET, the obtained aliases, and all the fin-
gerprints computed during the measurements. The aliases lists
also contain the IP addresses which were considered during
our alias resolution but could not be aliased at all.
In subsequent sections, we will provide results for the data
collected on April 14th, 2017. Those results are typical of what
we observed, though a few variations can be seen between con-
secutive campaigns due to adjustments brought to TreeNET
(e.g., improved IP-ID collection scheduling changed the rate of
aliases obtained through IP-ID-based methods in April 2017).
Nevertheless, interested readers can access our full public
dataset on GitHub6, along with TreeNET.7
B. Space Search Reduction
We first evaluate the benefits of our space search reduction
technique. Fig. 5 shows the percentage of fingerprinted IP
6https://github.com/JefGrailet/treenet/tree/master/v3/Measurements
7https://github.com/JefGrailet/treenet
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Fig. 6. Properties of collected fingerprints (April 14th, 2017).
addresses with respect to the total of responsive interfaces,
for each AS. With at most 30.71% of the responsive in-
terfaces entering the fingerprinting process, a lot of probing
is avoided. The lowest percentage is found in AS5511 (6),
with only 1.67%, which can be explained by the fact that
most of the responsive addresses at the time of probing were
gathered in large subnets, for which only a few interfaces
are considered for alias resolution. For example, in a /24,
only one or two IP interfaces are taken into account during
the fingerprinting process. The black curve shows the largest
aggregate of interfaces that were considered together for alias
resolution (i.e., from a same neighborhood) with respect to
the total number of responsive addresses. It further shows
how TreeNET simplifies the problem, despite the presence
of five peaks. We believe these peaks are a consequence of
heavy usage of routing policies such as load balancing, as it
complicates neighborhood inference [7].
C. Fingerprinting
Fig. 6(a) shows the spread of the different IP-ID counter
classes among the fingerprints collected for each AS. Simi-
larly, Fig. 6(b) shows the spread of the initial TTL values of
ICMP echo-reply messages (same date). Comparing both
figures shows that an IP interface with an healthy counter is
very likely to use the initial TTL value 64 (or, more rarely,
128), with a few exceptions, as highlighted at Fig. 6(c). As
an early study on fingerprinting [10] hinted that initial TTL
values correlate with the equipment brand (in particular, an
initial TTL of 2558 likely originates from Cisco equipment),
this suggests that grouping addresses with similar fingerprints
amounts to grouping IP interfaces which likely belong to
devices from a same vendor, which further demonstrates the
soundness of our approach.
UDP probing, on the other hand, has been successful for
only a few ASes from time to time. In previous measurements
conducted with an early version of our upgraded TreeNET
in April and May 20169, three ASes (AS5400, AS703, and
AS8220) had addresses responding to UDP probes, with up
to 55,60% for AS703. Such an observation does not show,
however, that the other ASes block this probing method, as
8It is worth noticing that RFC1700 recommends to use 64 as initial TTL
value [28].
9https://github.com/JefGrailet/treenet/tree/master/v2/Measurements/
the lack of reply could be due to some intermediate router
filtering out the probes.10 Indeed, we observed a peak of 20%
of aliases obtained through the UDP-based alias resolution on
January 9th, 2017 for AS8220 (which was the only AS replying
to UDP probes at the time), a peak which vanished from the
next datasets after the vantage point for this particular AS was
changed. Finally, in April 2017, we observed a significant
proportion of alias pairs obtained through this method for
AS10010 (almost 30%), an AS for which the approach did not
work previously. This shows that using a tool solely based on
this method has become highly unrealistic, though the method
should be at least tried when possible due to its high accuracy
and simplicity.
Finally, we evaluate the relevancy of checking if an interface
implements the reply to ICMP timestamp-request. We
observed in our data that, in some cases (notably AS224,
AS6453, AS8220, AS8928, and AS52 in our measurements
from April 14th), the proportion of devices implementing this
mechanism seems to correlate with the proportion of echo IP-
ID counters. However, this intuition is not always confirmed by
the data: the fingerprints of AS8928 shows, for instance, that
771 of the 1,421 fingerprinted interfaces (i.e., 54.25%) which
replied to ICMP timestamp-request have a healthy IP-
ID counter. On the other hand, in the case of AS224, 2,306
of the 2,769 fingerprinted addresses (i.e., 83.27%) which
feature an echo IP-ID counter indeed provide timestamps when
queried with ICMP timestamp-request. We leave as
future work a deeper study of this mechanism in the context
of alias resolution and fingerprinting in general.
D. Alias Resolution
Our alias resolution methodology has the natural advantage
of complementing a given technique with another, when the
former cannot be applied. In particular, we give priority to
the address-based method, when applicable, as it is the only
method where a reply is sourced at another interface. In
some cases, it can be very useful: almost 30% of alias pairs
were obtained with this method on AS10010 on April 14th,
2017.11 Moreover, since not all interfaces of a router partially
discovered through the address-based method will reply to
10Transit filtering has already been observed for IGMP probing [12].
11See https://github.com/JefGrailet/treenet/tree/master/v3/Measurements/
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Fig. 7. Alias resolution results (April 14th, 2017).
UDP, we can rely on the IP-ID-based methods (when possible)
to build a larger, more accurate alias.
Our approach also has the advantage of providing a coarse-
grained alias resolution (see Fig. 5) through the neighborhood
inference of TreeNET, but also through the grouping of
addresses which have similar associated fingerprints. Picking
and applying an actual alias resolution technique afterwards
therefore acts as a refinement. Furthermore, our approach uses,
by default, a fairly low amount of six probes per address for
both the fingerprinting and the collection of four IP-IDs for
IP-ID-based methods.
Fig. 7(a) shows the proportion of fingerprinted IP addresses
aliased with our methodology, for each AS on January 14th,
2017.12 This shows we can cover large amounts of interfaces
while state-of-the-art solutions alone would cover only a subset
of them. Finally, Fig. 7(b) shows the proportions of alias pairs
obtained through each technique. As expected, the usage of
address-based (or UDP-based) method is marginal due to the
lack of responsiveness, while IP-ID-based methods are still
applicable in a lot of situations. The Group bars correspond
to situations where no classical method could be used and
constrained us to group similar fingerprints from a same
neighborhood, because it was the only possible option, while
the DNS bars correspond to fingerprints which were grouped
because there was no new information besides DNS. The
considerable size of these bars, once stacked, highlights the
importance of performing space search reduction nowadays
due to the deprecation of historical approaches.
Of course, our current solution still has room for im-
provements. For instance, in April 2017, a new and more
thorough scheduling for collecting IP-IDs was implemented in
12Figures for other dates are also available in our repository.
TreeNET to improve IP-ID-based alias resolution and avoid
a maximum of false positives with this approach. In addition
to the problem of incomplete neighborhoods mentioned in
Sec. IV-B, the way TreeNET deals with internal nodes of the
network tree bearing multiple labels can also be improved,
and we intend to implement in the future a mechanism for
identifying the labels which actually belong to a same device
to better re-construct individual neighborhoods. Finally, as
our DNS-based approach remains very simple, we could also
elaborate some heuristics in order to identify the most common
naming conventions (e.g., numbered host names) and alias
interfaces on that basis.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a generic methodology to
tackle alias resolution, combining space search reduction and
fingerprinting as a way to reduce required additional probing
and evaluate the feasibility of different state-of-the-art alias
resolution techniques. This combination allows us to consider
multiple techniques for small sets of alias candidates, therefore
using a fairly low amount of probes.
Using a groundtruth network, we demonstrated that our
solution can achieve high accuracy with a reasonable amount
of probes while allowing the discovery of other network
elements in the process (subnets, in this case). With measure-
ments collected on different ASes from PlanetLab, we also
showed that the behavior of fingerprinted IP interfaces could
be linked with the vendor of the devices to which they are
assigned, which is an additional and useful hint to perform
alias resolution.
Of course, our approach can still be improved and deepened.
For instance, our space search reduction step remains quite
new (to the best of our knowledge) and can evolve in the good
direction as topology discovery topics like subnet discovery,
in this particular case, are explored. Nevertheless, we believe
that our methodology, currently implemented in TreeNET,
constitutes an adequate response to the current challenges of
alias resolution.
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